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Securities Regulation of Alternative
Litigation Finance
Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I. Introductions

Alternative Litigation Finance—or ALF—is a rapidly growing
largely unregulated industry, which poses myriad potential benefit
and problems. Although ALF has attracted significant scholarly atten
tion, the potential role for securities regulation of ALF has not beei
widely discussed. This Essay seeks to begin that discussion by analyz
ing the potential securities regulation of the ALF contract—which ii
the agreement between the ALF client (the recipient of ALF funds
and the ALF company (the supplier of ALF funds).
This Essay proceeds in five additional parts. Part II provides ar
overview of ALF, including a summary of the potential pros and cons
of ALF and the various regulatory responses proposed by scholars
Part III analyzes whether an ALF agreement satisfies the definitior
of "investment contract" so as to qualify as a "security," concluding
that an ALF agreement probably qualifies as a security in those
jurisdictions that apply a vertical commonality test. Part IV analyzes
whether ALF agreements implicate the central policy of the securities
laws—full and fair disclosure—and concludes that ALF agreements
are rife with information asymmetry, thus implicating this policy.
Part V analyzes how securities regulation would affect ALF contracts,
focusing on the prohibitions on the sale and advertising of unregis
tered, nonexempt securities and the antifraud provisions and conclud
ing that these provisions would partially redress the informational
imbalances identified in Part IV. Finally, Part VI briefly concludes,
arguing that the flexibility of securities regulation makes it a
particularly effective method of regulating an evolving industry such
as ALF.

II. What Is Alternative Litigation Finance?
Alternative Litigation Finance—or ALF—is third-party financing of
litigation, provided outside the traditional funding sources of
contingency-fee attorneys and insurers.1 The ALF industry is growing
rapidly.2 Even so, demand for ALF likely exceeds supply,3 setting the
Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Associate Professor at the University of Idaho
College of Law, where she teaches securities regulation and white collar crime.
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stage for the continued expansion of ALF. As it expands, this burton
ing industry continues to evolve,4 with myriad potential funding strur
tures, so any description is merely a snapshot.6
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enough to have a realistic opportunity to achieve legal success "23 thus
deterring "behavior that causes or allegedly causes compensable
harms.
At the same time, ALF poses the risk of a number of negative
consequences. First, ALF companies are logically drawn to highprobability suits where "underlying substantive law creates risk and
cost imbalances that already give plaintiffs the advantage."25 The ad
dition of ALF, which lessens the plaintiffs' remaining litigation risk
and increases the resources available to the plaintiffs, risks "exacerbat[ingl existing cost and risk imbalances that favor plaintiffs."26 Second,
the growing ALF industry may run out of high-probability suits to
fund and turn to low-probability suits, comforted by the ability to
diversify risk.27 As a consequence, ALF may "lead to an increase in
speculative litigation and strike suits on the margin."28
Finally, consumer ALF, a subset of ALF, poses unique dangers.
First, consumer ALF is potentially predatory, "target[ing] impover
ished plaintiffs awaiting personal injury awards with the lure of quick
cash."29 As a consequence, absent regulation, consumer ALF can
involve "misleading advertising, inadequate disclosure of financing
terms, and excessive financing charges."30 Indeed, commentators have
documented interest rates as high as 15%, compounded monthly,31
which can result in investment returns for ALF companies as high as
250%.32 Second, consumer ALF can distort settlements. Early in the
litigation, consumer ALF recipients may be incentivized by the pros
pect of compounding interest to settle the suit for less than the
expected value,33 thus distorting the deterrent effect of liability and
undercompensating the plaintiff. Late in the litigation, once the
financing charges have exceeded the expected value of the suit, a
consumer ALF recipient may reject even reasonable settlements
because "the plaintiff has nothing to lose in going to trial in hopes of
obtaining a recovery that leaves that person with money after repay
ing his or her ALF supplier."34
In light of the potentially negative consequences of ALF, commenta
tors have called for a wide range of enhanced regulation of ALF—
including outright prohibition,35 prohibition of ALF in personal injury
claims,36 limits on consumer ALF fees,37 a uniform system of disclosure
to consumers about the actual costs of ALF,38 state licensing of litiga
tion funders,39 the adoption of a "one-way fee-shifting rule in favor of
defendants" in cases where the plaintiff received ALF,40 the creation
of an online marketplace of consumer ALF finance,41 and federal
regulation by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or the
Federal Trade Commission.42
Yet, the potential role for securities regulation of ALF has not been
©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014
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and analogized ALF companies to venture capitalists.52 Indeed, one
commercial ALF company has noted that an ALF transaction, rather
than being structured as an ALF agreement, could be accomplished
by buying an equity interest in the company and becoming a minority
shareholder or by creating a separate class of equity amounting to a
percentage of the litigation outcome.53 Therefore, ALF contracts at
least "sound in" securities regulation, regardless of whether they
satisfy the technical definition of "security." Of course, sounding in se
curities regulation is not sufficient to come within the scope of the
federal securities laws.
Rather, in order to be subject to federal securities regulation, an
instrument must satisfy the definition of "security." "Unless the
context otherwise requires," the term "security" includes a laundry
list of instruments, such as stock, notes, and the catch-all category of
"investment contracts."54 The inclusion of investment contracts within
the scope of the securities laws "embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the count
less and variable schemes by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits."55 The securities laws do "not stop
with the obvious and the commonplace";56 rather, they apply equally
to "uncommon and irregular instruments,"57 including within their
scope "virtually any instrument that might be sold as a security."58
The Supreme Court, in SEC u. W.J. Howey Co., defined an "invest
ment contract" as "a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."59 Assuming
the investment of money (which ALF companies clearly make), there
are three distinct elements that an ALF agreement must satisfy in or
der to qualify as an investment contract: (1) the expectation of profits;
(2) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party; and (3) a
common enterprise. ALF agreements likely satisfy the first two ele
ments, and depending on the jurisdiction, may satisfy the third
element.
(a) Expectation of Profits
ALF companies invest in litigation "in hopes of making money."60 It
is conceivably possible that an altruistic ALF provider could be
incentivized to "improve access to justice for financially constrained or
risk-averse plaintiffs," but this is not the current reality.61 Indeed, one
scholar has documented that ALF companies earn "a rate of return
that far outstrips the average profit available in traditional invest
ment markets such as bonds, CDs, and even the stock market."62
Both the percentage of recovery returns earned by commercial ALF
companies, which depend on the total recovery in the underlying
©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014
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lawsuit," and the financing fees earned by consumer ALF companies,
Which do not so depend," qualify as profits. Indeed the Supreme
Court clarified in SEC u. Edwards that both variable and fixed returns
satisfy the Howey test: "We used 'profits' in the sense of income or
return to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or
the increased value of the investment. There is no reason to
distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of vari
able returns for purposes of the test, so understood.

(b) Solely From the Efforts of the Promoter or a Third
Party
The "solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party" ele
ment focuses on the degree of control that ALF companies exercise
over the litigation that they fund. The circuit courts have unanimously
declined to treat the word "solely" literally, "instead holding the
requirement satisfied as long as 'the efforts made by those other than
the investor are undeniably significant ones, those essential manage
rial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.' "66
This interpretation prevents a wily issuer from evading the securities
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IHor example, to protect its own interest in maximizing the fee it may
earn, a financing company may object to steps calculated to advance the
client s interests, such as pursuing a promising line of additional
discovery at a cost the company would prefer to avoid, or accepting a
settlement offer that does not meet the company's expectations regard
ing the return on its investment.74

Indeed, it is a significant open question' whether the contractual
delegation of control to the ALF company—such as the control to ac
cept or reject a settlement proposal—"is such a significant limitation
on the lawyer's representation of the client—because it interferes
with the lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment—that
the lawyer must withdraw from the representation of a client who has
agreed to such a contract provision."75 Likely to avoid implicating
these ethical issues, many ALF suppliers expressly disclaim any
control over the litigation in the ALF agreements.76 Indeed, some ALF
companies even go so far as to describe themselves as "passive."77 In
addition, in the context of consumer ALF, the relatively small size of
each individual lawsuit makes the exercise of control by the ALF
company economically unfeasible, except perhaps in the context of
settlement negotiations.78
In sum, despite incentives to do so, most ALF companies currently
do not exercise significant control over the litigation, likely out of fear
of forcing the plaintiffs attorney to withdraw from the representation.
Therefore, in the current market, the efforts of the plaintiffs attorney,
as the agent of the plaintiff, are the "undeniably significant ones."79
Finally, the plaintiffs attorney's efforts qualify as "essential mana
gerial efforts."80 Several courts have distinguished between manage
rial efforts and ministerial efforts, holding that if an investment's
profitability depends merely on the exercise of ministerial efforts "of
the promoter or a third party," the investment does not qualify as an
investment contract, regardless of who exercises those ministerial
efforts. For example, where the seller of silver bars retained posses
sion of the bars, but "the profits of the investor depended upon the
fluctuations of the silver market," the sales of the silver bars were not
investment contracts.81 Similarly, where the promoter of investments
in viatical settlements retained record ownership of the settlements,
but the investor's rate of return depended almost exclusively on "how
long the insured survives," the investments were not investment
contracts.82 In the context of ALF, one could argue that the ALF
company's profits, to be paid from any proceeds of the suit, depend on
the application of the substantive law to the underlying merits of the
suit and that the plaintiffs attorney's role should be characterized as
ministerial. In reality, however, the plaintiffs attorney's judgment
and skill undoubtedly affect the outcome of litigation, as evidenced by
©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014
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the ALF company will recover but the plaintiff will get nothing.89 This
narrow potential exception to the relationship between the recoveries
of the plaintiff and the ALF company probably does not prevent a
finding of narrow vertical commonality.
(d) Unless the Context Otherwise Requires
In sum ALF agreements likely satisfy the "expectation of profit"
and solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party" elements
of the Howey test. With respect to the "common enterprise" element,
ALF agreements do not satisfy the horizontal commonality test and
probably satisfy both the broad and the narrow vertical commonality
tests. Therefore, whether ALF agreements satisfy the Howey test
depends on the jurisdiction.
Separate and apart from the Howey test, however, an instrument
qualifying as an investment contract is treated as a security "unless
the context otherwise requires."90 This contextual inquiry centers on
whether the instrument needs the protection of the securities laws.91
In other words, the question of 'what is a security' is in many ways
the same as asking; should we apply securities regulation here?"92
Indeed, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, even though the subject agreement
arguably satisfied the Howey test, the Supreme Court declined to
treat it as a security, citing its uniqueness (including the right to us
age of a barn as one of its terms) and the fact that it was negotiated
one-on-one by the parties.93 Therefore, this Essay turns now to the
question of whether ALF implicates the policies underlying securities
regulation.
IV. Does Alternative Litigation Finance Implicate the Poli
cies Underlying Securities Regulation?
The essence of the securities laws is disclosure. The Supreme Court
has often stated that the federal securities laws are designed to ensure
full and fair disclosure to investors.94 For example, in Tcherepnin v.
Knight, the Court explained: "The Securities Exchange Act quite
clearly falls within the category of remedial legislation. One of its
central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of
full disclosure by issuers of securities . . . ,"95 As translated to the
context of ALF, this policy focuses on whether there is an information
imbalance such that ALF companies need the securities laws to ensure
that they receive full and fair disclosure about their investments.
Sometimes, however, the Supreme Court has stated the purpose of
the securities laws more broadly, arguably widening the policy to
include an interest in ensuring full and fair disclosure to all parties to
a transaction, not only to investors.96 As applied to ALF, this broader
policy potentially brings the information interests of ALF clients
within its scope. As discussed below, both ALF companies and ALF

©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014
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ALF suppliers by taking such actions as misrepresenting the strengths
of their legal claims in efforts to benefit financially. Such opportunistic
actions, which may not be detectable by ALF suppliers, are examples of
the well-known general problem called moral hazard,108
In fact, some commentators have even called for regulation requiring
"claimants to provide financiers full disclosure."109
As an example of alleged misrepresentations to an ALF company,
the CEO and co-founder of Burford Capital LLC, a commercial ALF
company, recently filed a declaration claiming that Burford was
fraudulently induced into investing in the Ecuadorian Lago Agrio Lit
igation against Chevron Corporation.110 Even though Burford
conducted "months of due diligence and negotiation" and the "Fund
ing Agreement included specific representations, including that none
of the plaintiffs or any of their lawyers knew anything 'reasonably
likely to be material to the Funder's assessment of the Claim that has
not been disclosed to the Funder,' "111 Burford now claims that it was
deceived about important components of the litigation, including the
alleged "ghostwriting" of a key plaintiffs' expert's report.112 Of note,
the plaintiffs and their attorneys dispute Burford's claims and attri
bute various motives to its current allegations, including fear of "be
ing blackballed by its target market following unanticipated public
disclosure of Burford's support of mass-tort plaintiffs."113 Regardless of
the merits of Burford's allegations, they demonstrate the potential for
fraud in this industry.
An ALF company can protect itself to a certain degree by negotiat
ing for the inclusion of penalty provisions in the ALF agreement114
and for staged financing based on the achievement of milestones.115
Once the ALF company's funds are disbursed, however, an ALF
company's right to sue for breach of the ALF agreement or right to
withhold future stages of funding may be of cold comfort. In short,
therefore, the securities laws' policy interest in ensuring full and fair
disclosure to investors is implicated in the context of ALF.
To the extent that the securities laws are concerned with full and
fair disclosure to all parties to a transaction, rather than merely to
investors, this policy is also implicated from the perspective of the
consumer ALF client. As discussed above, consumer ALF has the
potential to be predatory. Information asymmetries between the par
ties about the content of the ALF agreement exacerbate that potential.
Consumer ALF clients are often vulnerable,116 possessing unequal
bargaining power,117 and they "do not receive any precise information
regarding interest rates, fees, and repayment schedules until their
cases are approved for financing."118 As such, they may enter into ALF
agreements without understanding their terms. For example, in re
sponse to this problem, the New York Attorney General announced an
©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014
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probably exempt from registration under § 4(a)(2) of the Securities
Act and Kule 506 promulgated thereunder. Section 4(a)(2) exempts
from registration "transactions by an issuer not involving a public
offering.
As interpreted by case law, this exemption requires that
1) the offerees have access to the types of information that would be
contained in a full-fledged 1933 Act registration statement," and (2)
the offerees be sufficiently sophisticated to demand and understand
the information that is available to them."126 An ALF agreement likely
satisfies this agreement because the ALF company has the ability to
engage in at least some due diligence and because the ALF company
dS ianrI^Sit27tUtiOIial investor' is probably sufficiently sophisticated.'
Rule 506, a safe harbor under § 4(a)(2), contains a laundry list of
l equirements, the most stringent of which (the requirements to dis
close specific information128 and to verify the investor's knowledge and
experience129) are inapplicable to accredited investors. In the current
market, ALF companies likely qualify as accredited investors under
Kule 501(a)(8) because their owners are likewise accredited,130 either
as natural persons131 or as other entities owned by accredited owners.132
As the ALF industry evolves to include non-accredited investors
without access to detailed information about ALF clients, however,
these exemptions from registration may no longer be available.
Second, assuming for purposes of analysis that ALF agreements are
not exempt from registration, the current ALF industry doubly
violates § 5. First, ALF agreements are not typically registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission before sale, thus violating
§ 5(a)(1). Second, ALF companies routinely advertise their willingness
to enter into ALF agreements,133 effectively "offering to buy" unregis
tered ALF agreements, in arguable violation of § 5(c).
Finally, assuming that the current operation of the ALF industry
violates § 5, the ALF client does not have the right to rescission, and
the ALF company may be barred from seeking rescission by the in
pari delicto defense; as such, enforcement of § 5 will likely depend on
SEC involvement. Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act provides the
"purchaser" of a security offered or sold in violation of § 5 a right to
rescission.134 By statute, therefore, the rescission right resides in the
purchaser alone—here, the ALF company. Consistent with the AngloDutch Petroleum court's interpretation of a comparable provision
under Texas securities law,135 § 12(a)(1) does not provide the issuer—
here, the ALF client—the right to rescission. The right to rescission
under § 12(a)(1) is further limited, however, to purchasers who are
not in pari delicto,136 As the Supreme Court has interpreted the in
pari delicto defense in this context, a purchaser is barred from rescind
ing the purchase of an unregistered security where (1) the purchaser
is "at least equally responsible for the actions that render the sale of
©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014
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unregistered securities, the potential for SEC involvement may be the
most meaningful effect of the securities regulation of ALF.

VI. Conclusion
A T T^6AL^ indu®try 1S

complex, featuring commercial and consumer
ALF, and its future evolution is uncertain.147 As such, flexible regula
tion is imperative. Securities regulation, whose gap-filling role this
author has previously noted,140 might be the appropriate tool to
regulate the ALF industry, at least until such time as the industry
stabilizes.
Indeed, this essay concludes that ALF agreements—which are
entered into by ALF clients and ALF companies—arguably satisfy the
definition of "investment contract," thus qualifying as "securities" for
purposes of the federal securities laws. In addition, ALF agreements,
which the parties enter into with unequal information and which pose
the resultant risk of fraud, implicate the securities laws' central policy
of full and fair disclosure. Finally, the application of the securities
laws to ALF agreements, including the restrictions on the sale and
advertising of unregistered, nonexempt securities and the antifraud
provisions, would arguably redress the problem of informational asym
metry that ALF agreements pose.

NOTES:
1Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States, RAND
Law, Finance, and Capital Markets, at ix (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/con
$ent/dam/rand/pubs/occasionaI—papers/2010/RAND OP3Q6.pdf (proposing the term
alternative litigation finance," as opposed to "third-party financing," in order to sepa
rate the topic from the traditional third-party financing offered by contingency-fee at
torneys and by insurers).
2Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 455, 461
(2012) ("[WJhat started as a trickle of investments by hedge funds-not specializing in
litigation but rather investing opportunistically-has recently turned into a flood.").
3Garber, supra note 1, at 27 (characterizing the current environment as one "in
which the demand for ALF investments may greatly exceed supply of capital for such
investments").
4Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. Econ.
& Pol'y 593, 593-94 (2012) (describing the "cash-advance industry" and "the
syndicated lawsuit" as forms of ALF that have been in existence since the 1980s and
commercial ALF as "a new breed of third-party litigation financing [that] has evolved
in the United States").
5Steinitz,

supra note 2, at 461 (listing an array of potential funding structures).

6Garber,

supra note 1, at ix (noting that little is known "about how ALF activity
and ALF markets will evolve in the near and longer terms").
7Id.

at 8 (identifying the routes from suppliers of capital to demanders of ALF).
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percent of a settlement or award for the 'easier claims,' thus making it harder for
them to subsidize riskier litigation with the work based on those 'easier' claims.").
21 Fainter Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for
Champerty? 71 Chi.-Kent L Rev 625, 681 (1995) ("[I]f more efficient risk diversifies
could enter the market for legal-cost insurance, some lawyers probably would be
forced to lower their risk premiums or switch to billing by the hour instead.").
22Molot, supra note 13, at 66 (arguing that litigation finance can remove risk
preference from settlements) ("The Article recasts litigation finance as a potential
engine for good a force that may promote accuracy in adjudication where
conventional reform efforts have failed.").

"Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in
the United States Market, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 83, 85 (2008).
24Garber, supra note 1, at 29 (explaining that "if ALF enables many individuals
or organizations to strengthen their claims or to bring claims that they otherwise
would not bring, this could increase the costs to potential defendants of activities that
lead to claims and, as a result, decrease behavior that causes or allegedly causes com
pensable harms").

"Shepherd, supra note 4, at 610.
26Id.

"Lysaught and Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party Litigation
Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 645, 663 (2012) ("[A]s
cases are funded as part of a diversified portfolio or shared among several investors,
the risks of individual cases can be spread out across more secure investments or
many investors. This diversification and syndication of risk could facilitate even fur
ther investor speculation in the litigation asset class.").
2BId.

at 647.

"McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting A Legal and Ethical Course, 31
Verm. L. Rev. 615, 647 (2007).
"ABA, Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of
Delegates, at 7.
31Estevao, supra note 13, at 475-76 ("Interest rates can vary according to the size
of the cash advance and the facts of the particular lawsuit, and range from 2.5 percent
to 15 percent, compounded monthly."); Molot, supra note 13, at 93 (identifying "the
very high interest rates charged by cash advance firms—typically 3% to 5% monthly
interest, and often much higher").
32Estevao,

supra note 13, at 475-76.

33Garber,

supra note 1, at 33; ABA, Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational
Report to the House of Delegates, at 27.
34Garber, supra note 1, at 33; see also ABA, Commission on Ethics 20/20, Infor
mational Report to the House of Delegates, at 27 ("[T]he nonrecourse nature of ALF
means that there is no downside for the plaintiff in going to trial, because settling for
less than the amount owed to the ALF supplier yields the plaintiff nothing, while los
ing at trial means owing nothing to the ALF supplier, so the plaintiff still receives
nothing.").

"U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Selling Lawsuits; Buying Trouble 12
(Oct. 2009).
"McLaughlin, supra note 29, at 656.
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your money back. ); Steimtz, supra note 2, at 461 ("Like VCFs, which create and
manage portfolios of high risk in potentially high-risk companies, litigation finance
firms develop portfolios of high-risk, high-return litigation. To state the obvious, both
litigation finance and VC are forms of finance.").
"Submission of Burford Group LLC on the Working Group's Issue Paper Concern
ing Alternative Litigation Financing 3 (ALI Nov. 1, 2012).
5415

U.S.C.A. §§ 77b(a)(l), 78c(a)(10).

A r pSin^'
A.L.R. 1043 (1946).

H°Wey C°•' 328 U S" 293' 2"' 66 S" Ct 1100' 90 L- Ed-

1244, 163

6Securities and Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp
320 U S
344, 351, 64 S. Ct. 120, 88 L. Ed. 88 (1943).
57Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556, 102 S. Ct. 1220 71 L Ed 2d 409
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98471 (1982).
5BReves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61, 110 S. Ct. 945, 108 L. Ed. 2d 47 Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 73213, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94939 (1990).
59S.E.C. V. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 66 S. Ct. 1100, 90 L. Ed 1244
163 A.L.R. 1043 (1946).
60Garber,

supra note 1, at 23.

Shepherd, supra note 4, at 595 ("Instead, third-party investors aspire only to
maximize the returns from their investments in litigation.").
"McLaughlin, supra note 29, at 621.
"Garber, supra note 1, at 13.
6*Id.

at 9.

65S.E.C.

V. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394, 124 S. Ct. 892, 157 L. Ed. 2d 813, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92656 (2004).
66S.E.C. V. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 55, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91530 (1st Cir.
2001) (citations omitted); but see United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852 n.16, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 44 L. Ed. 2d 621, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95206
(1975) (expressing no view on the meaning of the word "solely" in this test).
67Securities and Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474
F-2d 476, 482, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93748 (9th Cir. 1973).
eeLong v. Shultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 133, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
U 95330 (5th Cir. 1989).

"ABA, Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of
Delegates, at 22 ("In order to protect their investments and to maximize the expected
value of claims, suppliers may seek to exercise some measure of control over the liti
gation, including the identity of lawyers (pursuing] the claims, litigation strategy to
be employed, and whether to accept a settlement offer or refuse it and continue to
trial .... ALF suppliers may also seek the right to advise on, or even veto, decisions
made by lawyers during the course of litigation.").
70U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Selling Lawsuits; Buying Trouble 7
(Oct. 2009) (citing examples).
71Steinitz, supra note 2, at 499.
72Id. at 508.
73Model Rule of Professional Conduct (ABA) 2.1.; see also ABA, Commission on
Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates, at 4 (2011) ("A lawyer
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monality was demonstrated by the investors' "reliance on the promoter's expertise
^ 3 fl3t

^

^

a

TwdT !?' aupra "ote ?3' at 76 ("Broad vertical commonality is present when
ever the first, third and fourth prongs of the Howey test are met. . Thus the broad
verticalI commonality test eliminates the common enterprise prong of the ftimey
test ) Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88, Fed. Sec L Ren (CCH) 11 9809K
RXaO^Eus. Disp Quide (CCH) ,8496 (2d Cir. 1994) Clf a comTon enteiriseZ
forts of !h
t TrB showm« that the fortunes of investors are tied to the efeoternr se pr°motar' ^separate questions posed by Howey-whether a common
I ft
and whether the investors' profits are to be derived solely from the
efforts of others-are effectively merged into a single inquiry . . . .").
B8Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88, Fed Sec L ReD (CCH) 1i QSOPft
R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) f 8496 (2d Ci'r. 1994)
monality as requirfing] that the fortunes of investors be tied to the fortunes of the
promoter ); SE C v. R.G. Reynolds Enterprises, Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1131, Fed Sec

mnnX
" f u, Vl® ^L'R' feA 657 <9th Cir' 1991) (holdinS that vertical'comnonahty was established where the promoter "told investors that he would take a
management fee based on the percentage of profits, thus making his own profit
contingent on the profit of his investors").
8
tevao'.s,uPra note 13> at 476 ("In some cases, the agreement may specify that
T !S
the LFC is entitled to 100 percent of the proceeds in the event that the actual recovery
is less than the scheduled payoff amount.").

dnn 9°Marine Bank v- Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59, 102 S. Ct. 1220 71 L Ed 2d
409, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) fl 98471 (1982) ("The definition of'security' in the 1934
Act provides that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the
Act is not to be considered a security if the context otherwise requires.").
suPra note ^3, at 72; see Securities and Exchange Commission v. C.
A/T
T G°rdon
M Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350, 64 S. Ct. 120, 88 L. Ed. 88 (1943)
(characterizing instruments as securities where "trading in these documents had all
the evils inherent in the securities transactions which it was the aim of the Securities
Act to end").
92Gordon III, supra note 83, at 72 (quoting Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis 89 (2d ed. 2008) (emphasis omitted)).
93Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560, 102 S. Ct. 1220, 71 L. Ed. 2d 409
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98471 (1982).
94Id. at 555 ("The [1934] Act was adopted to restore investors' confidence in the
financial markets . . . ."); Gordon III, supra note 83, at 63 ("The securities acts are in
large measure designed to provide enhanced disclosure to investors, either directly or
through the specific and general deterrent effects of civil, criminal, and administra
tive remedies.").
95Tcherepnin

v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 88 S. Ct. 548, 19 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1967).

9eReves

v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61, 110 S. Ct. 945, 108 L. Ed. 2d 47 Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 73213, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94939 (1990) ("Congress'
purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form
they are made and by whatever name they are called."); S.E.C. v. W J Howey Co
328 U.S. 293, 299, 66 S. Ct. 1100, 90 L. Ed. 1244, 163 A.L.R. 1043 (1946) ("It permits
the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of
'the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
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Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of
%
There is a significant unresolved question of whether disclosure of
^ privileged communications to an ALF supplier waives the privilege—that is, whether
e J the Ay supplier and the client have interests sufficiently in common to fall within
J. 4i l

104ABA

DelefteJ at 34 (

iln P fn0n"WalVS, T1le Ass(;cj?ti0n ofthe Bar ofthe City of New York CommitS'
Pini°n 2011"2: Third Party Liti&ation Financing
»» ?|oi n rwlnTh
CA| ( ?n)- (-,We n?te' however> that
argument has been made that the common inter
% 6St Pr^llege does not apply to such communications because the financing company's
7^ interest in the outcome of a litigation is commercial, rather than legal.").
On:

"h

wl

McLaughIin> supra note 29, at 623 (examining a consumer ALF applica
<-•
tion and noting that it requests information about "past and future wages lost and
past and future medical expenses").
107Steinitz,
108Garber,

H
B
le:
^
rl

.
J

105Steinitz, supra note 2, at 487 ("[CJurrent ethical rules greatly increase information asymmetries . . . . ).
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[V O L . 42:1 2014] S E C U R I T I E S R E G U L A T I O N O F A L T E R N A T I V E F I N A N C E
(2d ed.) ("A company's issuance of its own shares (treasury or authorized but unis
sued) is widely recognized as a sale for 10b-5 purposes, permitting derivative or simi
lar suits on behalf of the company."); see also Note: Securities Exchange Act:
Defrauded Issuer Has Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b), 1961 Duke L.J.
330 (1961).
144Section

21(d)(1) of the Exchange Act; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(l).

145Section

21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(3).

146ABA,

Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of
Delegates, at 3 ("Regulation that might be appropriate for products in a sector of the
market such as relatively unsophisticated one-off individual personal-injury plaintiffs,
may be inappropriate in a different segment of the market, as exemplified by invest
ments by hedge funds or high-net-worth individuals in commercial litigation.");
Garber, supra note 1, at xi ("Be skeptical of one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions,
because context matters, and it seems implausible, for example, that policies affecting
all kinds of ALF will be broadly effective in promoting social objectives.").
147Garber,

supra note 1, at 39 (arguing that "there are major unknowns pertain
ing to the current effects of ALF," that "the current and recent effects of ALF wouW
provide unreliable bases for predicting the future effects of ALF, and that we won t
know what new business modes for ALF suppliers might emerge ).
148Couture,

Securities Regulation As Gap-Filler: The Example of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 41 Sec. Reg. L.J. 207 (2013).
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